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Major Department: Software Engineering 
 
            In this thesis we introduce a generic security framework for public clouds called Treasure 
Island Security framework that is designed to address the issues related to cloud computing 
security and specifically key-management in untrusted domains. Nowadays many cloud structure 
and services are provided but as an inevitable concomitant to these new products, security issues 
increase rapidly. Availability, integrity of data, lack of trust, confidentiality as well as security 
issues are also of great importance to cloud computing users; they may be more skeptical of the 
cloud services when they feel that they might lose the control over their data or the structures 
that the cloud provided for them.  
Because of deferred control of data from customers to cloud providers and unknown number 
of third parties in between, it is almost impossible to apply traditional security methods. We 
present our security framework, with distributed key and sequential addressing in a simple 
abstract mode with a master server and adequate number of chunk servers. We assume a fixed 
chunk size model for large files and sequentially distribution file system with 4 separated key to 
decrypt/encrypt file. After reviewing the process, we analyze the Distributed Key and 
Sequentially Addressing Distributed file system and it’s Security Risk Model. The focus of this 
 
 
thesis is on increasing security in untrusted domain especially in the cloud key management in 
public cloud. We discuss cryptographic approaches in key-management and suggest a novel 
cryptographic method for public cloud’s key-management system based on forward-secure 
public key encryption, which supports a non-interactive publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme 
through a tree access structure.  We believe that Treasure Island Security Framework can provide 
an increased secure environment in untrusted domains, like public cloud, in which users can 
securely reconstruct their secret-keys (e.g. lost passphrases). Finally, we discuss the advantages 
and benefits of Cloud Computing Security Framework with Distributed Key and Sequentially 
Addressing Distributed file system and cryptographic approaches and how it helps to improve 
the security levels in cloud systems.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing, in its varying incarnations, continues to emerge as an attractive 
deployment option for enterprises and organizations seeking ways to reduce and better manage 
the costs associated with application deployment. Cloud providers and users both welcome new 
cost driven approaches. Commercial cloud services allow organizations to consume computing 
resources in a manner similar to traditional utilities, like electricity or water; paying for 
computing resources in a matter commensurate with their use.  This Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
model additionally exteriorize the costs associated with both system administrator and 
infrastructure administration while providing a potentially more scalable and reliable deployment 
environment [1].  These significant benefits have created an impression in the minds of many 
consumers and organizational decision makers that “the cloud” is the answer to any number of 
software dilemmas.   
But while the aforementioned benefits are undoubtedly attractive, these public cloud 
services are not without significant drawbacks within certain usage scenarios.  In circumstances 
involving highly confidential, sensitive or secret data, security issues inherent to public clouds 
render their use imprudent, impractical or in some cases impossible depending upon legal and 
regulatory requirements. 
 
1.1 Cloud Computing Security Issues  
Many papers and reports are published every year about cloud security issues and related 
risks, in this section we recall the concerns that were considered in our previously published 
paper [33]. Government entities and health care organizations for instance often face legally 
mandated data security requirements that nearly all cloud services are incapable of satisfying due 
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to a host of real and perceived security related issues [2-5]. The perception of the security and 
confidentiality vulnerabilities of public clouds has been reinforced by a number of data breaches 
reported in the media [6].  While governmental entities, regulatory bodies and medical 
organizations may benefit from the cloud given the large volumes of data generally involved 
with their respective activities, the risk of a single data breach often outweighs the potential 
benefits.  Although some cloud providers continue to address these security and regulatory 
issues, as Microsoft has with the addition of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) compliance features added to its Window’s Azure cloud service [7], public clouds still 
possess too many security unknowns for many organizations. 
As a result of these issues hybrid clouds have emerged as a middle ground between the 
aforementioned benefits of cloud computing and the identified security issues. Private clouds, are 
developed and administered by an organization’s internal IT department for the exclusive use by 
specific users or user groups within the organization [1, 8]. It is presumed that this greater degree 
of control guarantees an elimination of the security and regulatory issues posed by public clouds. 
But these private clouds may suffer from many of the same security issues as public clouds leading 
to a number of proposals designed to address these issues.  
Public clouds offer different advantages like better return on investment, availability, and most 
importantly, the low cost of use; however there are increased concerns about lack of reliability 
and security.  The important question is ‘how to take advantage of the public clouds as an 
infrastructure to achieve cost saving without sacrificing security and reliability’?  In this thesis 
we introduce Treasure Island Security Framework with two different levels of security models 
while also investigating different approaches in cloud security like Meta Data Encryption [21], 
distributed key and sequential addressing [33], mutation and lease that proposed and developed 
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by GFS group in google [22] [23]. These approaches have their pros and cons and impose 
additional costs to cloud providers. On the other hand recent research shows that security is the 
most common concern with cloud costumers [52][53], so a cost driven approach with decent 
security level could help cloud providers to have more security at a reasonable cost. 
Cryptographic techniques are one of most well-known and prevalent techniques in cloud 
security with key management as an impartible component of any cryptographic techniques. A 
weak point of the public cloud is in the case of a lost passphrase Secret Key (SK), there is no 
trusted third-party which can securely recover SK with a well-defined access policy. The recovery 
mostly runs through a procedure which must be ran by an authorized administrator where even in 
presence of a good policy and ethical agreements, the administrator has the chance to look at this 
secret key. Therefore we need a mathematical formulization of security to protect this procedure 
from adversaries which try to break the security of the encryption scheme. We propose a novel 
cryptographic approach for public clouds key-management service to avoid this problem in 
untrusted domains. 
 
1.2 Thesis Contribution 
In this thesis, we introduce our security framework titled as the Treasure Island Security 
Framework (TISF) which builds upon existing thinking to provide a scalable security framework 
for public clouds. TISF has two security levels,  
a. Basic level: TISF takes advantage of distributed key methodology 
b. Advance level: TISF uses cryptographic approaches in cloud’s key-management.  
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1.3 Thesis Overview 
 
The remainder of this thesis is as follows: 
 Chapter 2 will outline the cloud computing and security, definitions and approaches. 
 Chapter 3 will present the related works and discuss about other papers and researches in 
this area  
 Chapter 4 will all about our proposed security framework, Treasure Island Security 
Framework, and it’s security level 
 Chapter 5 will explain the security proof for our model. 
 Chapter 6 will summarize the main points of the thesis and will show possible new 
directions for future works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 2: BAKGROUND  
 
Cloud computing might be a new name of technology which hints at a future in which 
chromebooks and similar cloud-based computers will supersede local computers, but believe it 
or not it is not a  new idea; and appears with different names like grid computing, etc. John 
McCarthy, an American computer scientist who coined the term “Artificial Intelligence” 
predicted in 1961 that “computation may someday be organized as a public utility”. In the early 
90’s his idea was followed by Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider’s who brought the “intergalactic 
computer network” idea in which “for everyone on the globe to be interconnected and be able 
access programs and data at any site, from anywhere”.  
The term of “Cloud Computing” is used by Ramnath Chellappa [29], [30] in his speech, 
“Computing has evolved from a main-frame-based structure to a network-based architecture. 
While many terms have appeared to describe these new forms, the advent of electronic 
commerce has led to the emergence of 'cloud computing.' This work aims at analyzing the role of 
agents and intermediaries enabling this framework.” 
One of the best official definitions of cloud computing provided by The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) [31]”Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is 
composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.” 
These days Cloud computing will be offered in different categories by different providers and 
companies with three main service models; but most of their services and models are similar in 
these characteristics: 
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 On-demand self-service which allows users to use computer capabilities like network 
storage or server time that are prepared unilaterally by their Cloud service provider 
 Rapid elasticity: this is one of major characteristics which sets cloud computing apart 
from other concepts like data centers and networks of networks in that Capabilities can be 
elastically provisioned and released to scale outward and inward commensurate rapidly 
mostly automatically [31]. 
 Resource pooling: users of cloud computing can use the ability of a cloud service to serve 
multiple customers by using a multi-tenant model. These different models and services 
could be on different physical and virtual resources which dynamically assign and 
reassign according to demand [31]. 
 Measured service: all systems, resources and services will be controlled and optimized 
automatically by the cloud system, and these resource usages can be easily monitored and 
reported by the cloud provider. 
Cloud Computing premises can be broken up into these three main Categories. 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
 Platform as a service (PaaS) 
 
Software as a Service (SaaS) 
In this model the application delivered by the cloud system is ‘as a service’ rather than ‘as on-
promise’ software. Various client devices have access to applications through a program 
interface or even a thin client interface like web browsers (or web-based email). Software as a 
Service is becoming a progressively customary delivery model as underlying technologies 
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support web services and SOA, new scripting, developmental approaches. This popularity was 
accompanied by rapid growth of broadband services that is widely available to support user 
access from more locations around the world. 
The key fact of this popularity is described by NIST [31], “The consumer does not manage or 
control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, 
storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-
specific application configuration settings.” 
Easier administration, Automatic updates and patch management, Compatibility, Easier 
collaboration, and global accessibility are some of benefits of SaaS model.  
Platform as a Service (PaaS)  
In the Platform as a Service delivery model, cloud providers will prepare all hardware, operating 
systems, network capacity and storage for the user over the internet. PaaS will allow the 
customer the ability to rent virtualized servers and relevant services for running existing 
applications or developing and testing new applications through the internet. 
In this model the customer will not be required to manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructures like storage, servers, networks or even individual application capabilities (with 
the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings). [31] 
 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
Infrastructure as a Service is a provision model in which an organization outsources the 
equipment and hardware used to support operations (sometimes is addressed as hardware as a 
service). The cloud provider is responsible for ownership, maintenance and running the services. 
The client typically pays on a per-use basis for components of IaaS that mainly include utility 
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computing service and billing model, automation of administrative tasks, desktop virtualization, 
dynamic scaling and policy-based services. 
By the definition that NIST provide [31] “The consumer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed 
applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cloud computing different layers and approaches based on NIST definitions. 
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CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORKS  
 
There is a significant body of work which documents the challenges and proposed solutions 
to the issue of cloud security; in both public and private [9-11]. We recall some of these related 
works that were previously addressed in our research [33]. Many of these works take substantially 
different approaches to the issue of cloud security given the broad topic that is cloud computing.  
The approach taken within these works revolves primarily around an overlapping use of 
encryption, distributed key methodology, sequential chunk addressing and dynamic metadata 
reconstruction to improve system security.  We consider related works to both distributed key and 
cryptographic key management in this chapter. 
 
3.1 Distributed Key with Sequential Addressing 
Distributed key methodology is not a new concept, having significant support with the 
literature albeit in significantly different conceptualizations and implementations [12-14]. A form 
of distributed key methodology serves as the backbone of the security effort proposed within this 
work whereby the key necessary to decrypt individual file chunks and reconstruct a stored file is 
distributed within our proposed system. This methodology stands in contrast to the some of the 
more common methods of cloud authentication such as those based primarily on password 
protection and Private Key Infrastructure (PKI). While these techniques are relatively easy to 
implement, they have a number of deficiencies which have been documented in the scientific 
literature and the media. Password protection for instance is dependent upon the user’s ability to 
maintain confidential information against social engineering attacks wherein information enabling 
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the reconstruction of one or more passwords may be divulged inadvertently by a user [15].   
Password methodology is additionally troublesome given the average user’s penchant for 
password reuse [16].  While the reuse of an existing password minimizes the cognitive load that 
memorizing a number of different passwords for different systems creates, reuse effectively means 
that a password compromised for one system allows malicious users to access a host of other user 
accounts. This is especially troublesome for email accounts which often serve as key link in the 
user verification process for many systems.  Ticket based authentication using the Kerberos 
protocol is an improvement over pure password based protection, however, this methodology still 
possesses security risks [17].  A breach of a system’s authentication server will result in the 
exposure of all user accounts due to the centralization of authentication management. [18]. Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) addresses some of these issues through the use of digital certificates for 
entity identity verification [19].  This approach however also has a number of flaws [20].  The 
distributed key approach utilized within our proposed system addresses many of these issues by 
using a decentralized form of authentication that eliminates the single point of failure found in 
password protection scheme given the use of a segmented, dispersed key. This methodology is 
further bolstered by our use of a form of dynamic metadata reconstruction, which protects 
information about the stored data and chunk encryption [20]. 
 
3.2 Cryptographic Key-Management  
Cryptographic approach has a long history of use in the clouds security, each part of our 
proposed model, if considered alone, have a lots of similar related works. Our approach in 
relying on Public Key Encryption and Forward-Secure Public Key Encryption and PVSS 
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schemes to access trees, and heavily based on approaches that had been introduced by d’Souza 
et.al [34]. 
We introduce Forward Secure Public Key Encryption which support a non-interactive 
Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme, to take advantage of session based PKE scheme 
which is more secure than a simple PKE scheme. Using FS-PKE which is constructed based on 
Binary Tree Encryption method, will help us to compare the FS-PKE + PVSS model with other 
types of forward security schemes like Hierarchal Identity-Based Encryption methods. 
The idea of forward security for public key encryption was introduced by Ross Anderson 
in 1997 during an ACM conference on Computer and Communication Security [47]. FS-PKE is 
based on session keys which are secured for different sessions independently, and in case of 
compromising one key other sessions will not be affected.  
There are different approaches, like weak forward security, that take advantage of 
security mediator [48] [49] which holds a share of secret key and both user and security mediator 
must sign on a message or decrypt the received cipher-text. Strong forward security [50] is 
another approach which improves the security issues that appear in weak forward security by 
updating public key in each time period by user before sending message to CA to get a 
certification. Both weak and strong forward security schemes are based on time sessions.  
In Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing, D’Souza [34] shows that only a standard PVSS 
scheme could not be supported by a PKE scheme, they worked on Stadler [51] and standard 
extension of blakley-shamir secret sharing scheme [34] to take advantage of using the Access tree 
in their work. Our approach heavily relies on their work, but we prefer to use another non-
interactive PVSS scheme, which satisfy BDH conditions.  
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In Next chapter we will introduce Treasure Island Security Framework, which mostly 
focused on the role of keys in cloud security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 4: TREASURE ISLAND SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
While the Google File System (GFS) [22-23] and the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) 
[24-26], a GFS derivative, are commonly utilized with public clouds, we have proposed an 
alternative cloud architecture upon which the Treasure Island Security Framework is based. The 
Distributed Key and Sequentially Addressing Distributed file system (DKASA), which builds 
upon aspects of both GFS and HDFS, improves the security of data storage and file distribution 
in a private cloud primarily through the introduction of dynamic metadata reconstruction, 
sequential addressing and distributed key methodology. Later in this chapter we will introduce 
our cryptographic approach, based on FS-PKE which support a non-interactive publicly 
verifiable secret sharing scheme through an access tree. This security level which takes 
advantage of individual sessions, can be safe and secure approach in public clouds key-
managements or generally for any key-management service who act in an untrusted domain. 
These approaches can help user to avoid the common security related harms in public clouds like 
data loss, inaccessibility, replication or data modification and access which causes by threats like 
hacking, government powers or injection. Table 3.1 summarizes these harms and threats: 
 
Threat 
Harm 
Hacking Government 
Powers 
Injection DDoS 
attack 
Data Loss √ √ √ X 
Inaccessibility  √ √ √ √ 
Data Modification √ √ √ X 
Data Replication √ √ √ X 
 
Table 3.1. Cloud computing threats and harms     
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4.1 Distributed Key and Sequentially Addressing File System 
As we introduced in our previously published paper [33] the Distributed Key and Sequentially 
Addressing Distributed file system (DKASA), as illustrated in Fig. 1, has a number of 
characteristics borrowed from the GFS including a single master configuration, use of fixed 
chunk sizes and chunk replication. We provide assumptions with respect to the configuration of 
DKASA within our proposed framework to contextual the security risk model discussed in 
Chapter 5. We first recall the definition of some elements from our recent paper [33]. 
4.1.1 Single Master Server 
Both Single Master (SM) and Dual Main Server (DMS) configurations are possible within the 
DKASA file system although our method is based on the use of the former; mirroring the GFS.  
The DMS configuration, which involves the use of a management server and a file retrieval 
server, is potentially less robust than the SM configuration given its relatively poor performance 
under stress. It is likely, with moderate to high levels of network traffic and significant numbers 
of large files, that the retrieval server in the DMS configuration becomes a bottleneck for the 
entire system.   
4.1.2 Fixed Chunk Size and Multiple Replicas 
We anticipate the use of a fixed chunk size, which enables the use of the GFS mutation and lease 
method to reduce network traffic.  Unlike the GFS which uses a fixed size of 64MB we have 
consciously chosen to leave the size of the chunk ambiguous as both large and small chunk sizes 
have advantages and disadvantages.  A large chunk size for instance will reduce the number of 
chunk servers needed for each client while also reducing the client’s interaction with the master 
for reading metadata and namespaces.  This large chunk size however is also incompatible with 
smaller files. A smaller chunk size is compatible with smaller files however it may result in 
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greater data fragmentation. In an actual implementation of our framework a system architect 
would determine the appropriate chunk size for the specific usage scenario.  
 
 
Figure 2. Treasure Island Security Framework Abstract Model 
 
Each chunk within the system will have a number of replicas (k) to ensure data availability; each 
replica chunk exists in isolation from the original.  In the event that the original chunk is 
unavailable the replica system will retrieve a replica and use that data to reconstruct the original 
file. 
4.1.3 Encryption 
Each chunk’s data is encrypted in the client machine and sent via secure communication using 
RSA [26] and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption [28].  The key differentiation 
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between traditional approaches and our approach that proposed in this work is the use of a 
distributed key approach as opposed to the use of usual Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  
4.1.4 Distributed Key and Sequential Addressing 
The use of a distributed key methodology has been driven mainly by two important factors, a 
desire to increase security while introducing a level of tractability whereby different security 
levels with different costs and different requirements exist within the system.  In terms of the 
latter, this type of security granularity facilitates varying degrees of file and user level security as 
opposed to a methodology within which the level of security within the system as whole is the 
only manipulable value.   
Distributed key methodology as proposed within the DKASA system involves the distribution of 
a cryptographic key into four isolated parts.  The first two parts of the key are stored in the 
master server and the client, the third part is stored in each chunk (n) and the final part of the key 
is stored in the previous chunk (n -1).  For the first chuck the last key will come from Chunk n 
(last chunk). A file to be stored in the public/hybrid cloud will be divided into a series of 
sequentially addressed chunks with distinct, appended headers and footers. The header of each 
encrypted chunk contains the following information:  
• 128 bit local deciphering key 
• 128 bit remote deciphering  
• key The address of the next chunk  
• 128 bit status code used to identify the chunk as either an original or replica 
chunk. 
• 1024 bits of audit data 
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This header data is used by the Cloud Management Server (CMS) and the user’s client during the 
file retrieval process to locate file chunks, decipher them and rebuild the original file using the 
distributed key and sequential addressing approach.  The full key necessary to decrypt each 
encrypted chunk is produced as a result of the concatenation of the parts of the key stored on the 
master server, the client, the current chunk server and the previous chunk server are illustrated in 
Fig. 2.    
 
 
Figure 3. TISF Sequential Addressing and Distributed Key Methodology 
 
 
Upon successful completion of this process an interim copy of the file is available to the user on 
the client machine. Upon the completion of file manipulation (read, update, delete, etc) by the user, 
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the mutation and lease method as employed within the GFS the chunks are stored on new servers. 
The complete file access algorithm is shown in Fig. 3  
 
 
Figure 4. The complete file access algorithm 
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4.2 Cryptographic Approaches for Cloud Key-Management Service 
In this chapter we propose a novel cryptographic approach for public clouds key-management or 
generally key-management service in any untrusted domain. We will use a forward security 
public key encryption scheme which must support a non-interactive publicly verifiable secret 
sharing scheme through an access tree structure.  
Our focus in Cloud Key-Management service is on key recovery part. Suppose that user A have 
pair of (PK, SK) as public key and secret key. If A loses the SK, the system must recover this 
key through an access structure and verify that this key will works as a secret key. In untrusted 
domain, a set of procedures will recover and verify the secret key and crucial point is that 
adversaries can attack and find the secret key during recovery and verification, we must find a 
way to store any secret keys in encrypted mode (Using PKE) and we need a cryptographic tools 
to allow us to securely recover and verify this encrypted secret key. For the first part we 
introduce a FS-PKE scheme and will use a non-interactive PVSS scheme to support recovery and 
verification. 
 
4.2.1   Preliminaries 
Our work is mostly focused on using Forward Secure Public Key Encryption scheme which is 
supported by a non-interactive Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme in Cloud-based key 
management. This method help us to recover a Secret Key (SK) securely without allowing any 
adversary to find any information about SK. We assume familiarity with definition of PKE, PVSS 
and EL-Gamal systems.  
As we mentioned, this chapter mainly focused on key recovery and verification. We need to store 
SK in some encrypted form and allow the cloud system to verify that legitimate parties can recover 
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the secret key without compromising any information about it. For recovery and verification key 
though a set of legitimate parties we need a tool like publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme [51] 
and to store SK in an encryption form, we can use Forward Secure Public Key Encryption, which 
is take advantages from acting as an individual session based cryptosystem. 
We will review some of these definitions in the next section: 
Access Structure: As reported in [34] [35] [36] a collection 1
{ ,,, }
2 n
P PĄ  when 1{ ,, , }nP P  is a set 
of parties, called monotone if , , ,B C if B Ą B CthenC Ą     , An access structure is a 
collection Ą  , 1
{ ,,, }
2 n
P PĄ  and Ą   ,any sets in Ą  called Authorized and any set not in Ą  will 
be called unauthorized. 
Binary Tree Public Key encryption (BTE) scheme: Is a 4 tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Der, Enc, 
Dec} [32] [37] such that: 
- The Key generation algorithm Gen() must generate public key PK from a security 
parameter 1k and initial root Secret Key SKe  
- The Key Derivation algorithm Der() takes 2 parameter, name of a node *{0,1}w and 
nodes associated secret key SKw and returns two secret keys SKw0 and SKw1 for the children 
of node w. 
- The Encryption Algorithm; Enc (), will encrypt message m with public key PK and node 
w and return the cipher text c. 
- The Decryption Algorithm; Dec (), will decrypt cipher text c with Public Key PK and node 
name w. 
In the article published by Canetti et.al [32] the correctness requirement, for any key set {PK, SKe} 
which have been generated by Gen () Algorithm, for any node *{0,1}w , and SKw which are 
generated for node w, m can calculated as we shown on Eq.(1) 
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(PK, w,SK , (PK, w,m))wm Dec Enc      (1) 
Where m is our message, SKw is the secret key in node w and PK is the public key. 
Our contribution includes  
 a Forward Secure Public Key Encryption scheme,  
 In regards to FS-PKE we use a Public Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme which could be 
supported by our FS-PKE scheme, over an access structure A. 
We assume that there is a Valid-Check algorithm such that shown in Eq. (2) 
(PK,SK) 1 iff k , ( , ) (1 )kValid Check PK SK inthe rangeof K           (2) 
Where PK is the public key and SK is the secret key 
Before introducing our model, it is necessary to look at different parts of this model:  
Forward Secure Encryption: in 1989 Gunther proposed a session key exchange protocol and in his 
paper titled “An identity-based key-exchange protocol” [38], he proposed a term called “perfect 
forward secrecy”, in which for the impersonated user, the hardness of finding the key is equal to 
breaking Diffie-Hellman scheme for every 3rd-party when the protocol is running. Generally 
speaking, forward secure encryption is about using session keys. If long term key is compromised 
the protocol will provide a forward secrecy, and it is independent of past session keys which had 
been established before the compromise of long term key. This independency between session 
keys is the biggest advantage of the Forward Secure Encryption.  
From encryption point of view, forward security means any break-in to the system has no effect 
on information which is encrypted prior to break-in. for example consider this sequence actions: 
- First, Alice and Bob must generate a shared session key K together,  
- Alice encrypt message m with K 
- In last step both of them will delete shared session K promptly. 
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We can define this concept for public or private key encryption respectively, in this situation 
obviously the confidentiality of information that has been encrypted using some secret info in the 
past is not affected by loss of secret at present.  
In terms of Forward Secure Encryption we mostly follow the notation and approaches that are 
introduced by Canetti et. al[32], we use Binary Tree Encryption (BTE) definition and introduce 
four functions of encryption, derivation/update, Decryption and generation. Then we will use the 
output PK and SK in PVSS model.  
FS-PKE supports Publicly VSS: a forward secure public-key encryption scheme supporting 
publicly verifiable secret sharing for an access structure A consist of 8 function  
{ , , , , , , ,Re }Gen Upd Enc Dec Setup Share Verify const    (3) 
 Such that the 4-tuple {Gen, Upd, Enc, Dec} is a forward-secure public-key encryption scheme 
and  
Setup (n, 1k) as a randomized algorithm will compute public value P
iP
 for every iε[n] and 
corresponding Secret Key SKi, the setup function’s output is a vector like 
1 1
{(P , ),..., (P , )}
nP P n
SK SK  
Share (PK, SK, A) is a randomized algorithm for generating encrypted shares, takes PK , Secret 
Key SK and Access Structure A as input and will produce string π as output.  
Verify (PK, π, A) is verification algorithm which takes public-key PK, String π and Access 
structure A as input and just {1, 0} as output,  
 Reconst(PK, π, A, SKs) is for recovering Secure Key SK, the function takes Public key and string  
 
π and Access structure A and SKs and the output is new Secure Key SK’. 
{ k ,Valid AccessStructure A,P[Verify(PK, ,A) 1:( , ) (1 ) ( , , )] 1kPK SK K AND Share PK SK A      
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In security models and VSS scheme we introduce the model that was originally used by D’Souza 
et.at [34] in their approaches in their PKE-PVSS model and then we introduce new non-interactive 
PVSS scheme for our FS-PKE & PVSS model which was proposed by Tian et al [39] [40]. 
 
4.2.2 Access Tree 
In security systems, wherever we have parties which need to work together to obtain a resource, 
we need an access structure. A qualified set, in fact, is a group of these parties that are granted 
access. We have different types of access structures, for example monotone and non-monotone 
access structure (in monotone access structure if subset M is in access structure, all sets A which 
M A  is monotone and in access structure), multi-threshold access structure that was introduced 
by Farras et.al [41] which is suitable for multi-secret sharing schemes and access structures based 
on graphs that were proposed by Beimel et.al [42]. Here we use a tree threshold access structure 
that was recently used in identity based encryption [43] [44], attribute based encryption [45] [46] 
and also verifiable secret sharing. We recall the basic framework of Access Trees that have been 
used in secret sharing. 
Let Access Tree   be a tree that represented an access structure, each non-leaf node of the tree 
represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value, if numx is the number 
of children of a node x and kx is it’s threshold value, then 0≤ kx ≤ numx .When kx =1 the threshold 
gate is an OR gate and when kx = numx, it is and AND gate. Each leaf node of tree is described by 
a party Pi and a threshold value kx. 
To facilitate working with the access tree, we defined a few functions. We denote the parent of 
node x by Parent(x). The access tree   defines an ordering between children of every node. The 
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children of a node x are numbered from 1 to numx. The function ind(x) returns such a number that 
is associated with the node x. 
Satisfying an Access Tree. Let   be an access tree with root r. Denote x  by the sub-tree of   
that rooted at the node x. Hence   is the same as r . If a set  n   of indices satisfies the access 
tree x , we denote it as ( ) 1x   . We compute ( )x   recursively as follows. If x is a non-leaf node, 
evaluate ' ( ) 1x    for all children x’ of node x. ( )x    return 1 if and only if at least kx children 
return 1. If x is a leaf node, then ( )x   return 1 if and only if ( )ind x  . 
 
 
 
4.2.3 An Efficient scheme FS-PKE support a non-interactive PVSS Scheme 
Now we can present our complete system, Forward Secure Public Key Encryption (over a BTE) 
which defined session based, without loss of generality, we can reconstruct any SKi (for any i in 
time indices) because for any i we have unique SKi, and Valid () function could test this situation 
for us. Also we can observe that our FS-PKE scheme is an El-Gamal system [32]. 
Our system contain a FS-PKE scheme which will support a non-interactive publicly verifiable 
secret sharing scheme through an access tree. This system is based on bilinear pairing and is proven 
secure in standard model under BDH assumption. As noted before, we will present an FS-PKE 
scheme with four functions and briefly talk about non-interactive PVSS schemes which is 
compatible with our assumption.  
The encryption scheme has 4 functions, key generation or Gen () must generate public and secret 
key, assume 2 groups like G1 and G2 prime order q and also e as bilinear map, 
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^
1 2( , , , , , , )PK G G e P Q t H  , Se=αH(ε) where P is a random generator 1P G  and α is a random 
variable such  q   and set Q= α P 
Upd () will update secret keys and because our focus is on reconstructing secret key in untrusted 
domains we can assume that updating keys do not change anything in reconstructing procedure 
because we can reconstruct any secret keys in our BTE tree based on our access structure and 
reconstruction method.  
Enc (PK,w,m) [32] will encrypt based on w=w1,….,wl and random  q 
_
( , ( |1),..., ( ),m.d)C P H H       and 
^
d e(Q,H( )) . 
We first recall the decryption function from Canetti et.al [32]. Then, based on this function, we 
can easily shape our reconstruction method in PVSS scheme. Obviously reconstruction of an 
encrypted secret key exposes no information about the secret key.  
Dec (PK, ω,SKω,C) will decrypt cipher text C and takes ω=ω1… ωι and SKω =(Rω|1,.., Rω, Sω) and 
cipher text C is equal to (U0, … , Ul, υ) and decryption will compute by m= υ/d where d is calculate 
as shown in Eq.(4)  
^
0
^
|1
1
( , )
( , )i
i
e U S
d
e R U




    (4) 
Now we can move to the PVSS model and the 4 functions (setup, Share, Verify and Reconst) in 
PVSS scheme, as you can see in decrypt and encrypt function in our fs-PKE scheme our functions 
are based on 
^
e(Q,H( ))  , 
^
0( , )e U S   and  product of e(,) so we can use this feature and Lagrange 
interpolation to build (or change) our reconstruction method. The difference between the 
reconstruction method in our approach and reconstruction in a regular non-interactive PVSS 
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scheme, like Tian et. al  [39] [40], is in our approach we must decrypt shares for relevant leaf nodes 
in our Access Tree and then apply PPT interpolation in exponent recursive mode to reconstruct 
the SK so we have an extra step based on our access tree to obtain our reconstruction, In the 
reconstruction method we must define a recursive function DecryptNode(π,SKs,x) that takes secret 
key, string π and node x, and the output must be null or an element in G1, so we can easily 
reconstruct our secret key. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 CHAPTER 5: SECURITY ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION 
 
5.1 Treasure Island Security Framework’s Security Risk Model 
Here we recall the security risk models that was considered before in Treasure Island Framework 
[33]. This approach adds security beyond that found in security schemes using public key 
infrastructure and single password methodologies in that the likelihood of system compromise 
from a single attack is largely eliminated.  We use the previously outlined assumptions and the 
presumption of a single file broken down into many chunks (N), each possessing many replicas 
(K) within a distributed key architecture to evaluate this claim.  We define the distributed key as 
Eq. (5) 
1k i i cm msD D D D D                (5) 
Where Dk is Final K, Di is Key of Chunk i, Dcm is Client’s Machine Key and Dms represent 
Master Server’s Key 
All four isolated parts of the key are necessary to construct the full cryptographic key required to 
decipher each chunk.  To evaluate the likelihood of comprise, it is thus necessary to calculate the 
availability of each of the four key components with respect to their individual locations: the 
master server, the client, the original chunk and the previous chunk.  Within the working system, 
the master server is constantly operational, therefore the availability of this component to an 
attacker is equal to 100% or 
For the client machine the window for an attack is based on the total time of connection.  For the 
purpose of this analysis we assume a client connection duration that is represented as TCM. For 
the final two key components, it is necessary for an attacker to successfully attack two different 
chunks, the current chunk and the previous chunk, to assemble all of the components necessary 
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to reconstruct the full cryptographic key.  The probability of a successful attack in this scenario 
can calculate by Eq. (6) 
2( ) 2
!2!
( 2)!
s
n
s
s
N b
C
N
N
 


                   (6) 
Where Ns is total number of Chunk servers and the denominator is the number of all choices and 
the numerator is the likelihood that an attacker successfully selects the server containing the first 
chunk.  Thus the chance of gaining access to all the necessary items for deciphering a chunk will 
be (Eq. (7)) 
2( ) 2
!2! 86400
( 2)!
s CM
FA
s
s
N b T
P
N
N
 
 

   (7) 
Where Ns is total number of Chunk servers  
The availability of a file for a user, in the event of a server failure or malware attack, depends 
upon the number of replica chunks that exist for each original.  When there are replica chunks, a 
high risk situation exists for the integrity of the user data. In that file, chunks exist 
without a backup.  We assume K = n and all chunks have a backup, therefore a full copy of the 
entire file exists.  The total number of full file backups may be determined by  
The chance of successful file retrieval after any malware attack server failure is shown in Eq. (8): 
p
i
P
A K
n K

   (8) 
Where Pp equals availability of a server in the system, K the quantity of replica control chunks, 
and n the number of chunks per file. 
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5.2 Cryptographic approach security model 
For PVSS scheme we need to prove correctness and soundness properties such that for Honest 
Dealer and shareholders, every qualified subset of shareholders (which identified with access 
structure A) can reconstruct the secret during the reconstruction algorithm (correctness). We can 
claim consistency of secret commitment values with share deriving values only if dealer passed 
the verification algorithm successfully (soundness). 
For privacy proof we must show that in presence of honest dealer, adversary cannot learn any 
information about secret, we defined security through a game played by challenger and PPT 
adversary, both of them given λ as security parameter. 
Just notice that the adversary is static which have the corrupted shareholder’s secret key, we could 
explain this level in 3 steps: Setup, Challenge and Guess. 
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup (λ) to obtain the set of public parameters as well as all 
shareholders Public and Secret keys. In this step, adversary is given t-1 corrupted shareholder’s 
secret keys and moreover all public keys 
Challenge: Based on our model, here the challenger will pick two distinct message M and M’ with 
same length and also a random bit b and compute the cipher-text Mb with Share () function and 
distribute all resulting info to A as well as {M, M’} 
Guess: In this step the adversary must output a guess bit b’  
The advantage of adversary in this game is defined by Eq. (9):  
,
1
( ) Pr[ ' ]
2
SA IND
PVSS AAdv b b
       (9) 
Where λ is a security parameter and b and b’ are guess bits. 
We can consider a definition which Tian et.al used in their model [39] [40]:  
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Definition : a (t,n)-Threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme called SA-IND (Static 
Adversary – IND) secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A, (Eq. (10)) 
 
, ( ) ( ) for anysufficiently large 
SA IND
PVSS AAdv negl  
      (10) 
Where λ is the security parameter 
We can say a forward secure public key encryption scheme supporting a publicly verifiable secret 
sharing is called secure in SA-IND game (Static Attack) if all PPT algorithms have at most one 
negligible advantage in the security game. [39][34][32] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS  
This thesis has revealed a novel security framework for public clouds called the Treasure 
Island Security Framework (TISF), which is based upon a DKASA Distributed file system.  We 
have introduced DKASA and the methodology behind its proposed implementation while 
evaluating the security risks inherent in our approach.  We believe that our proposed approach 
enhances both data availability and integrity while providing a higher degree of security and 
backup control at both the user and file level. Perhaps the most significant advantage of the 
DKASA cloud as proposed is the avoidance of the most common public cloud security and data 
availability issues; issues which have been chronicled exhaustively in both the press and the related 
scientific literature. Our subsequent work will seek to evaluate our claims within a pilot project 
which will be documented in a future paper. 
As we mentioned before, such a formal treatment of key management, which act in untrusted 
domain with focus on running key management services in public clouds or similar domains only 
worked by D’Souza et.al [34]. Using FS-PKE and key management service based on individual 
sessions has not previously appeared. The benefits of using FS-PKE could help this new approach 
to act more secure and supporting of a non-interactive PVSS model, can help us to take advantage 
of verifying and reconstructing secret key securely on untrusted domains like public clouds. Along 
the same line as encryption, forward security means a break-in to current system will not affect 
previously encrypted information, so this feature could help us to claim our approach could work 
better than previously suggested systems.  
Our future work will follow the current thesis, albeit with focus on the non-interactive PVSS model 
which was introduced briefly in the current work. We will discuss in detail how we check every 
step in our model and propose an implementation for our model. We already introduced all the 
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necessary conditions of this PVSS model specially for VERIFY() function, and as a future work 
we will continue working on introducing rearranged PVSS model. 
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